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SUPREME OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW FENN HILTON, et al.,

;
\
i:

PlaintiffsAppellants,
V •

Case No. 20040

4

MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et a l M
DefendantsRespondents.

:
:
;

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by investors in Grove
Finance Company against the State of Utah and the Department of
Financial Institutions to recover the amount of the investment
lost when Grove Finance became insolvent in 1980.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District
Court, granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment on the
basis of governmental immunity.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the order granting
summary judgment and a remand to the district court allowing
the case to proceed to trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Grove Finance Company was incorporated in 1960 as a
small loan business pursuant to Section 7-10-1, ej; seq*, Utah
Code Ann, (repealed 1969).

(R. at 837, 771.)

From 1960 until

1969 Grove Finance Company operated as a small loan business.
When the Small Loan Act was repealed in 1969, Grove
Finance Company opted to become a supervised lender pursuant to
Section 70B-3-501, et seq., Utah Code Ann.

(R. at 838, 772.)

In 1969, W. Smoot Brimhall, who was at that time the
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions, made
a determination that Grove Finance Company as a supervised
lender was not subject to the Department's jurisdiction under
Sections 7-1-7 and 7-1-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
379-380, 839, 772.)

(R. at

The Department of Financial Institutions,

pursuant to Section 70B-3-506, Utah Code Ann., established a
procedure whereby it made annual examinations of the loan
records of Grove Finance Company.

(R. at 839, 773.)

From the early 1970,s until its closure in 1980, Grove
Finance Company held itself out to the general public as
accepting monies on deposit and in fact did accept monies on
deposit.

(R. at 839, 864-865, Deposition of Howard Sherwood,

pg 14.)
From the early 1970,s until its closure in 1980, Grove
Finance Company through its agents and in the mass media
advertised that deposits made in Grove Finance Company were
insured up to $10,000.

(R. at 839, 835, Deposition of Howard

Sherwood, pg 23.)
Between 1969 and 1980, the Department of Financial
Institutions received a number of telephone calls from
individuals claiming to be depositors of Grove Finance
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Company.

They stated that they had either a savings

certificate or a passbook issued by Grove Finance Company.

(R.

at 925.)
During this same period of time, the Department of
Financial Institutions received telephone calls from
individuals inquiring as to whether the debentures sold by
Grove Finance Company were insured.

The Department of

Financial Institutions was also told that agents of Grove
Finance Company had represented to the public that the monies
deposited in the Company were insured up to $10,000.

(R. at

835, Deposition of Howard Sherwood, pg 23.)
None of the inspections of Grove Finance Company
performed by the Department of Financial Institutions uncovered
evidence that Grove Finance Company was accepting monies on
deposit.

(R. at 839, 390.)
Between 1969 and 1980, Hal S. Haycock, one of the

officers of Grove Finance Company, commingled the assets of
Grove Finance Company with his personal assets.

(R. at 840.)

On March 13, 1980, in response to a complaint received
by the Department of Financial Institutions from the Bank of
American Fork, the Department of Financial Institutions sent
Gary R. Cox and Code Shaw to examine Grove Finance Company.
(R. at 375.)

Mr. Cox and Mr. Shaw found that the records of

Grove Finance Company were in a state of shambles and that the
information submitted by Grove Finance Company on its reports
to the Department of Financial Institutions could not be
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verified or confirmed by the books and records of Grove Finance
Company.

Mr. Cox stated in his report to the Department of

Financial Institutions:
The many inconsistencies noted between the
financial statements received from this company
which tend to confuse and mislead along with lack
of bookkeeping and control exhibited by Grove
Finance Company are a major concern. Bcised on
the bookkeeping methods being employed by this
institution, a clear, well-defined accounting
trail that could be followed does not exist . . .
(R. at 898.)
As a direct result of the examination by Messrs. Cox
and Shaw on April 8, 1980, the Department of Financial
Institutions issued a cease and desist order to Grove Finance
Company requiring that it cease and desist from any further
sales of debentures or any further activity which would result
in money or other assets being transferred into Grove Finance
Company in exchange for an obligation of Grove Finance
Company.

(R. at 385, 900A.)
At approximately the same time that it issued the

cease and desist order, the State of Utah hired the CPA firm of
H. Sherwood & Company to audit the books and records of Grove
Finance Company.

(R. at 382, Deposition of Howard Sherwood, pg

7.)
On or about July 18, 1980, the Department of Financial
Institutions petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County to allow the Department of Financial Institutions
to take possession of Grove Finance Company.

On that same day

an order granting possession of Grove Finance Company was
-4-

signed by Judge Ballif and the Department of Financial
Institutions closed Grove Finance Company.

(R. at 841.)

On or about August 22, 1980, Grove Finance Company
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah.

(R. at 841.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action originally commenced as three separate
complaints, each brought by a group of investors in the defunct
Grove Finance Company.

Two of the three actions were

consolidated on October 27, 1982.

(R. at 410-412.)

action was consolidated therein on June 22, 1983.

The third
(R. at

765-766.)
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss on January
5, 1983.

(R. at 594-595.)

The motion was argued before Judge

Timothy R. Hanson on March 4, 1983 and was denied on May 18,
1983.

(R. at 753-754.)
The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment

on July 21, 1983.

(R. at 783-784.)

The plaintiff brought a

motion for summary judgment on July 28, 1983.
833-834.)

(R. at

These motions were argued before Judge Timothy R.

Hanson on November 3 and 8, 1983.
Judge Hanson issued a memorandum decision denying
plaintiffs' motion and granting defendants1 motion on April 26,
1984.

(R. at 962-966.)

An order awarding judgment for the

defendants was entered on May 22, 1984.

(R. at 968-969.)

A notice of appeal was filed with the district court
on June 20, 1984.

(R. at 761-762.)
-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
HAD A STATUTORY DUTY TO INSPECT GROVE FINANCE COMPANY
The basic position of the appellants in this action is
that the Department of Financial Institutions had a statutory
duty to make certain inspections of Grove Finance Company and
that the losses sustained by the appellants in this action are
due to the failure of the State of Utah to make the required
inspections.
A*

Duty to Inspect Under Title 7.

In 1981 the Utah

State Legislature repealed most of the sections of Title 7 and
replaced them with the Financial Institutions Act of 1981.

The

cause of action in this case arose prior to this change in
state law and all citations to sections in Title 7 are to the
former law as it existed at the time when the cause of action
arose.
Grove Finance Company at all times from 1969 to its
closure in July 1980 was a corporation doing a bcinking business
under Utah law.

Section 7-3-3 which defines a bcinking business

states as follows:
Any corporation holding itself out to the public
as receiving money on deposit, whether evidenced
by a certificate, promissory note or otherwise,
shall be considered as doing a banking business
and shall be subject to the provisions of this
chapter as to such business.
If this case is allowed to proceed to trial,
appellants will establish, among other things, that the
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Department of Financial Institutions was on notice that Grove
Finance Company was indeed accepting money as if on deposit
long before the Department issued the April 1980 cease and
desist order.

Knowledge of this activity would have brought

Grove Finance Company within the purview of Title 7 under
U.C.A. §7-3-3.
According to Section 7-1-7 of the Utah Code Ann., all
financial institutions required to obtain a license under Utah
law were to be subject to examination by the Bank Commissioner
and examiners.

Section 7-1-7 stated as follows:

All banks, all loan and trust companies, all
building and loan associations, all industrial
loan companies, all credit unions, all small loan
businesses required to obtain a license under any
provision of law, and all bank service
corporations shall be under the supervision of
the banking department and shall be subject to
examination by the Bank Commissioner and
examiners.
Grove Finance Company was in the business of making
small loans and, although Chapter 10 of Title 7 dealing with
small loan companies was repealed in 1969, the language of
Section 7-1-7, Utah Code Ann., was not changed until 1981.

It

should also be noted that Grove Finance Company even as a
supervised lender was required to obtain a license from the
Department of Financial Institutions and was therefore a small
loan business required to obtain a license under "any provision
of law."
The Commissioner of the Department of Financial
Institutions had a statutory duty to annually visit and examine
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those financial institutions under his jurisdiction.

Section

7-1-8, Utah Code Ann., provides as follows:
The bank commissioner, or an examiner, shall
visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every
loan and trust corporation, every building and
loan association, every industrial loan company,
every small loan business, and every cooperative
bank, and at least once a year. At every such
examination careful inquiry shall be made as to
the condition and resources of each institution
examined, the mode of conducting and managing its
affairs, the official actions of its directors
and officers, the investment and disposition of
its funds, the security afforded to its members,
if any, and to those by whom its engagements are
held, whether or not it is violating any
provisions of law relating to corporations or to
the business of the institution examined, whether
or not it is complying with its articles of
incorporation and bylaws, and as to such other
matters as the commissioner may prescribe.
The Commissioner of the Department of Financial
Institutions has, therefore, a very clear duty under Title 7 to
inspect those financial institutions which fall under his
jurisdiction.
B.

Duty To Inspect Under Title 7QB.

While the

respondents in this case have continually denied that they have
any duties to inspect Grove Finance Company pursuant to Title 7
of the Utah Code Ann., the respondents have admitted, however,
that Grove Finance Company is under their jurisdiction pursuant
to Title 70B of the Utah code and that the respondents have a
statutory duty to examine the loans, business and records of
Grove Finance Company pursuant to Section 70B-3-506 of the Utah
Code.

(R. at 387-388.)
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Section 70B-3-505 imposes a duty upon every licensee
to "maintain records in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles and practices and in a manner that will
enable the administrator to determine whether the licensee is
complying with the provisions of this act."

Grove Finance

Company was therefore required by Title 70B to keep its records
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles and
practices.
Section 70B-3-506, Utah Code Ann., requires:
That administrator shall examine periodically at
intervals he deems appropriate the loans,
business and records of every licensee.
The Department of Financial Institutions pursuant to
Section 70B-3-506 established a policy of examining each
supervised lender subject to its jurisdiction once a year.
If this case is allowed to proceed to trial,
appellants will establish, among other things, that the
inspections of Grove Finance Company conducted by the
Department of Financial Institutions were inadequate in their
scope to comply with the requirements of Section 70B-3-506,
Utah Code Ann.
In reviewing the motions for summary judgment, the
district court apparently found that the applicable duties
under Titles 7 and 70B were discretionary rather than mandatory
or ministerial under Section 63-30-10(1)(a), Utah Code Ann.
(1953).

(R. at 138-139.)

Hence, the court found no waiver of

immunity and judgment was entered for the defendants on the
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basis of governmental immunity.

As will be more fully

discussed herein, the duties of inspection were in fact
mandatory or ministerial and the failure of the State in this
regard cannot be waived.

Thus the district court erred in its

findings on duty to inspect.
POINT II
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHIELD THE
RESPONDENTS FROM SUIT BECAUSE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED FOR THIS TYPE
OF NEGLIGENCE ACTION
The appellants allege and believe they can establish
at trial that the respondents had statutory duties under both
Title 7 and Title 70B of the Utah Code to supervise the
financial integrity of Grove Finance Company and that the
respondents negligently failed to perform said duties.

The

issue before this Court, however, is whether the respondents
are immune from suit by virtue of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Code states in pertinent
part:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act,
all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function . . . .
The appellants do not dispute that the regulation of
financial institutions in the State of Utah is a governmental
function under the standard set forth in Standiford v. Salt
Lake City Corporation, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), which defines
a governmental function as an activity of such a unique nature
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that it can only be performed by a governmental agency.

This

Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) f
specifically held that the "supervision of financial
institutions is an activity of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency."
Therefore, the claim of the appellants is that
immunity for the negligent conduct alleged in.the case at bar
has been waived by Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code.

This

section states in pertinent part as follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of his employment
.

. . .

This section of the Governmental Immunity Act clearly
waives governmental immunity for all governmental entities
based on a claim of negligence; provided, however, that the
negligence does not fall into one of the eleven enumerated
exceptions to this waiver of immunity.
The district court in its memorandum decision held:
The nature of defendant Borthick1s actions or
claimed failure to act even if such were proven,
are discretionary, and do not fall into a class
of activities where governmental immunity has
been waived.
(R. at 139.)
This ruling is in error and should be reversed by this
court.
A.

Respondent's Conduct Did Not Fall Within The
Definition Of Discretionary Functions.

Section 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953), states
that a government entity is immune if the injury:

(1) Arises out of the discretion or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function/ whether or not the
discretion is abused • . ..
In Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the discretionary
ministerial function distinction is the protection of
governmental entities from suits for acts and decisions at the
policymaking level.

In this regard, the Court stated:

This Court has followed the lead of cases
interpreting the Federal Torts Claim Act by
distinguishing between those decisions occurring
at a broad policymaking level and those taking
place at the implementing operational level. In
Carroll v. State Road Commussion, this Court
recognized that almost all acts require some
degree of discretion, and observed that the
exception to the waiver set forth in the Act
should be confined to those decisions and acts
occurring at the basic policymaking level, and
not extended to those acts and decisions taking
place at the operational level, or in other words
. . . those which concern routine everyday
matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy
factors.
Id. at 519-520.

[Emphasis added.]

The respondents are not immune from suit under the
discretionary function exception to the waiver of governmental
immunity for negligent injuries because the negligent acts
occurred when the respondents were operating at the operational
level.

An examination of the relevant statutes in this case

clearly indicates that the respondents were not operating at
the broad policymaking level in making the determinations that
the respondents now claim are immune from suit based on the
discretionary function exemption.
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B.

The Legislature Not The Respondents Set The
Policy As To Which Financial Institutions Are
Subject To The Jurisdiction Of The Department Of
Financial Institutions.

The respondents alleged in the lower court that they
were responsible to make the basic policy determinations as to
which financial institutions are statutorily subject to the
Department of Financial Institutions.

(R. at 614.)

This broad

policy, however, was not left up to the discretion of the
respondents in this case, but rather was specifically
prescribed by the State Legislature.

Section 7-3-3 states:

Any corporation holding itself out to the public
as receiving money on deposit, whether evidenced
by a certificate, promissory note or otherwise,
shall be considered as doing a banking business
and shall be subject to the provisions of this
Chapter as to such business. [Emphasis added.]
Clearly in this section of the banking code the State
Legislature and not the Department of Financial Institutions
has made the broad policymaking decision as to which
institutions are subject to banking supervision.
the Legislative level.

was made at

The subsequent determinations by the

Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions as to
which corporations in this state do and do not fit this rather
clear definition are on he operational level and are not immune
from suit.
In Fidelity Casualty Company of New York v. Brightman,
53 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1931), the court in considering the
distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions
stated:

The Missouri rule is in line with the general run
of authority that a public official charged with
discretionary duties is not liable for a mistake
of judgment or an erroneous performance of said
duties unless he be guilty of willful wrong in
relation thereto, but as to ministerial duties he
is liable for the violation or neglect thereof to
the party injured thereby and that a mistake of
judgment does not excuse him.
Id. at 165.

[Emphasis added.]

There may be some judgment required even in the
performance of mandatory ministerial duties.

However, even if,

as claimed by the respondents, the Commissioner of the
Department of Financial Institutions had to exercise judgment
in determining which financial institutions came within the
very specific definition of Section 7-3-3 of the Utah Code,
such judgment making does not become transformed into a
discretionary function

The Commissioner of the Department of

Financial Institutions remains liable for a mistake in judgment
in such a case.
C.

The Legislature Not The Respondents Set The
Policy As To The Kind Of Supervision To Be
Exercised By The Department Of Financial
Institutions.

The respondents claimed further in the lower court
that they were required to make a discretionary decision as to
what kind of supervision the Department of Financial
Institutions was to exercise over the financial institutions in
its jurisdiction.

(R. at 614.)

Again, it is clear from the

law that this policymaking decision has already been made by
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the Legislature and was not left up to the Department of
Financial Institutions.

Section 7-1-8 of the Utah Code

specifically set forth:
The bank commissioner, or an examiner, shall
visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every
loan and trust corporation, every building and
loan association, every industrial loan company,
every small loan business, and every cooperative
bank, at least one a year. At every such
examination careful inquiry shall be made as to
the condition and resources of the institution
examined, the mode of conducting and managing its
affairs, the official actions of its directors
and officers, and investment and disposition of
its funds, the security afforded its members, if
any, and to those by whom its engagements are
held, whether or not it is violating any
provisions of law relating to corporations or to
the business of the institution examined, whether
or not it is complying with its articles of
incorporation and bylaws, and as to such other
matters as the commissioner may prescribe.
[Emphasis added.]
In addition, Sections 7-1-8 and 7-1-13 through 7-1-23
further set forth in detail the kind of supervision which is to
be exercised by the Department of Financial Institutions over
the financial institutions under its jurisdiction.

The

carrying out of the specific statutory requirements are
therefore ministerial acts and not discretionary acts.
In State es rel. Funk v. Turner, et al., 42 S.W.2d 594
(Mo. 1931), the Missouri Supreme Court considered the
responsibility of the bank examiner and stated as follows:
The difficulty arises in the classification of
the duties of a bank examiner, whether
discretionary or ministerial. To solve this
question we must refer to Section 11689 R.S. Mo.
1919. This section makes it mandatory that every
bank be examined at least once a year.
Additional examinations may be made when deemed
necessay in the judgment of the commissioner.
The section further provides:

On every such examination inquiry shall be made
as to the condition and resources of such
corporation or banker, the mode of conducting and
managing its affairs, the actions of its
directors or trustees if a corporation, the
investment of its funds, the safety and prudence
of its management, the security afforded to those
by whom its engagements are held, and whether the
requirements of its charter and the law have been
complied with in the administration of its
affairs; and as to such other matters as the
commissioner may prescribe.

By the provisions of this section the
commissioner must make at least one examination
each year. This duty is not a discretionary one,
but it is ministerial; he has no alternative or
choice in the matter. The same section leaves it
to the judgment of the commissioner to make
additional examinations . . . . We are also of
the opinion that the section makes it the
mandatory duty of the officer who conducts the
examination, to inquire into the various matters
set out in the statute. Since it is mandatory it
becomes a ministerial duty, the examiner must
make the inquiry with reference to the various
matters set forth in the statute.
A haphazard examination by an examiner into the
matters required by the statute is not
sufficient. Where a statuts requires an act to
be done, it must be performed with a reasonable
degree of diligence, care and prudence. Failure
to so perform that duty is in law negligence.
Id.

at 598.

[Emphasis added.]

The respondents thus had a clear mandated duty to
examine each year all financial institutions which came within
the definition set by the Legislature in Section 7-3-3.

Even

the type and extent of inspection was set by the Legislature.
Respondents cannot therefore say that they had to exercise
discretionary judgment in determining the kind of supervision
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which the Department of Financial Institutions should exercise
over the financial institutions within the State of Utah.
D.

The Respondents Decisions As To The Manner In
Which They Would Supervise Does Not Rise To The
Policymaking Level.

The respondents claimed in the lower court that they
also had discretionary decisions as to the manner in which such
supervision was to be carried out by the Department of
Financial Institutions.

Although some discretion may have had

to be exercised, it would not rise to the level of basic
policymaking and therefore does not come within the exception
to the waiver set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act.
Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888
(1972).
In the 1965 debates over Senate Bill No. 4, which
later became the Governmental Immunity Act, Senator Welch, the
sponsor of the bill, explained to his Senate colleagues that
the proposed Utah Governmental Immunity Act was patterned after
the Governmental Immunity Act which had been enacted in
California in 1963.

Section 820.2 of the Government Code of

California is California's equivalent to Utah's Section
63-30-10(1).

The California statute reads as follows:

A public employee is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or omission where the act
or omission was the result of the exercise of the
discretion vested in him, whether or not such
discretion be abused.
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The California courts, like the courts in Utah, have
considered a great number of cases defining this discretion
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity.

In Johnson

v. State, 73 Cal. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968), the California
Supreme Court noted:
It would be difficult to conceive of any official
act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did
not admit some discretion in the manner of its
performance, even if it involved only the
hammering of a nail.
Id. at 357.
The court therefore looked to the legislative purpos
for this discretion exception to the waiver of governmental
immunity and determined:
Courts and commentators have therefore centered
their attention on the assurance of judicial
abstention in areas in which the responsibility
for basic policy decisions has been committed to
coordinate branches of government . . . .
Id. at 360.
In Ramos v. County of Madera, 94 Cal. 421, 484 P.2d
(1971), the California Court stated:
* n Johnson we reviewed the semantic quicksand
which had ensnared the concept of "discretion" in
the unyielding trap of incomprehensibility. We
noted that discretionary acts have been defined
as those wherein no hard and fast rule as to the
court of conduct that one must or must not take
Finding the semantic distinction between
discretionary and ministerial inadequate as a
method of deciding actual controversies, we
followed our landmark precedent of Lipman v*
Brisbane Elementary School District, (citiation
omitted), in concentrating on policy
considerations relevant to the governmental claim
of immunity. Discretionary activity, we held, is
related to basic policy decision, or that
-18-

activity sometimes characterized as the "planning" as
opposed to the operational level of decisionmaking.
^d.

at 98-99.
It is clear, therefore, that this discretionary

exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for negligent
action of employees of public entities both as interpreted in
the State of Utah and in the State of California only applies
to basic policymaking decisions.

In the instant case, the

State Legislature, and not the respondents, made the basic
policy decisions and the respondents were left simply to
implement those decisions on an operational level.

Respondents

therefore are not entitled to the protection of the
discretionary exception to the waiver of governmental immunity.
E.

Examination of the Statutory Language Establishes
Appellants' Position.

In dealing with the problem of whether a statute is
mandatory or directory, this Court has stated:
We are impressed with the difficulty that would
be encountered in attempting to state any
definite and invariable rule by which directory
provisions of a statute could always be
distinguished from those which are mandatory. It
best serves our purpose here to point out
generally that there are at least some guidelines
to be followed. The most fundamental one is that
the court should give effect to the intention of
the legislature. That requires us to consider
what the figurative "legislative mind" would have
intended had it adverted to the particular
circumstances we are confronted with for
adjudication. This in turn leads us to analyze
the statute in the light of its history and
background; the purpose it was designed to
accomplish; and wha interpretation and
application will best serve that purpose in
practical application.
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Sjostrom v, Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393, P.2d 472 (1964).
With respect to its use in a statute, the word "shall"
is usually presumed to be mandatory.

State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah

2d 45, 347, P.2d 1111 (1960).
Examination of the relevant statutes upon which the
appellants rely in asserting a duty on the State shows
extensive use of the word "shall."
The bank commissioner, or an examiner shall visit
and examine every bank . . . at least once in
each year.

At every such examination, careful inquiry shall
be made as to the condition and resources of the
institution examined . . . .
Section 7-1-8, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.]
The bank commissioner may at any time, and at
least once a year shall require the board of
directors of very institution . . . to examine or
cause to be examined fully the books, papers and
affairs of the institution . . . .
Section 7-1-14, U.C.A.

[Emphasis added.]

The bank commissioner shall each year make not
less than four calls for report of condition upon
each bank . . . .
Section 7-1-17, U.C.A.

[Emphasis added.]

The administrator shall examine . . . the loans,
business and records of every licensee « . . .
Section 70B-3-506, U.C.A.

[Emphasis added.]

This may be contrasted with use of the word "may" or
the phrase "shall have power to" in other various sections of
Title 7.

See, for example, Sections 7-1-12, 7-1-16 and 7-1-18,

U.C.A.
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The manner of use of the word "shall" in these
statutes is entirely consistent with language specifically
directing that something be done.

There is no discretion

involved.
POINT III
RESPONDENTS' NEGLIGENT CONDUCT WAS MORE THAN
A FAILURE TO MAKE AN INSPECTION OF PROPERTY
Appellants alleged in their complaint that the
respondents had a duty to:
(A) Vist and examine every banking business at
least once a year.
(B) At the time of each annual visit to inquire
into the condition and resources of the
institution examined, the mode of conducting and
managing its affairs, the official actions of its
directors and officers, the investment and
disposition of its funds, the security offered to
members and whether or not it was violating any
provision of law;
(C) Notify the board of directors of any banking
business in writing if any officer or employee of
that bank was found to be dishonest, reckless or
incompetent or fail to perform any uty of his
office;
(D) Require the
banking business
institution with
ascertaining the

board of directors of each
to examine the affairs of the
a special purpose of
value of the security thereof;

(E) Call for not less than four separate reports
each year concerning the condition of each
banking business to certify such report for
publication;
(F) To call for special reports as may be
necessary for the protection of the public;
(G) Inform the county attorney of any violation
of any provision of law which constitutes a
misdemeanor or felony by any officer, director or
employee of any banking business • . ..
-21-

Utah Code Ann. §§7-1-8, 7-1-13, 7-1-14, 7-1-17, 7-1-18
and 7-1-23.)
The respondents, as well as the district court,
apparently lumped these duties together and defined them as a
duty to make an inspection of the records of Grove Finance
Company.
The district court granted respondents1 motion for
summary judgment in part on the basis that Section
63-30-10(1)(d), Utah Code Ann., operates as an exception to
waiver of immunity from suit for the breach of these duties.
Section 63-30-10(1)(d), Utah Code Ann., states:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately committed within
the scope of his employment except if the injury
. . . (d) Arises out of a failure to make an
inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate
or negligent inspection of any property . . . .
This section does not have applicability to the duties
of respondents as found in Titles 7 or 70B of the* Utah Code.
Hence, the court erred in holding that an inspection of
property was involved in this case and thus granting
governmental immunity.
To understand this concept, it is necessary to first
consider how Section 63-30-10(1)(d) is to be applied.
The fundamental consideration which transcends
all others in regard to the interpretation and
application of a statute is: What was the intent
of the legislature?
. . .

In determining that intent, the statute should be
considered in the light of the purpose it was
designed to serve and so applied as to carry out
that purpose.
-22-

Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411
P.2d 831 (1966).
There is apparently no case law in Utah which
specifically interprets what constitutes an inspection of
property within the meaning of §63-30-10(1(d), Utah Code Ann.
However, the transcript of the 1965 State Senate debates over
Senate Bill No. 4, which later became the Governmental Immunity
Act, is instructive.

As noted above, Senator Welch, the

sponsor of the bill, explained to his senate colleagues that
the proposed Utah Governmental Immunity Act was patterned after
the Governmental Immunity Act which had been enacted in
California in 1963.
The California statute reads as follows:
A public entity is not liable for injury caused
by its failure to make an inspection, or by
reason or making an inadequate or negligent
inspection of any property, . . . for the purpose
of determining whether the property complies with
or violates any enactment or contains or
constitutes a hazard to public health or safety.
Deering's Gov. C. §818.6.
The purpose of this section of the California Code is
to retain governmental immunity where an inspection of physical
property is involved in determining whether or not it complies
with safety standards or constitutes a hazard to health.
The corresponding section of the Utah Act was intended
to have the same purpose.

During the senate debates over the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Senator Welch explained the
purpose of this section of the Governmental Immunity Act:
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So if the city turns up a plumbing inspector who
inspects the plumbing or inspects the furnace and
something goes wrong and it explodes, you can't
sue the city on account of that by saying that
the inspector was negligent. You cannot bring an
action against that individual or entity.
(R. at 664.)
The only Utah cases decided under Section 63-30-19(d)
confirm this meaning.
Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 24 Utah
2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), involved application of the statute
to deny liability for the failure of the state to inspect
safety devices at railroad crossings.
White v. State, 579 P.2d 921 (Utah 1978), involved a
claim of injury due to the failure of certain vegetable canning
equipment to meet prescribed safety standards.

Section

63-30-10(1)(d) was applied in finding the State not liable for
failure to take action after an O.S.H.A. inspection revealed
safety violations.
It is clear from the foregong that there is a clear
distinction between making an inspection of property within the
meaning of Section 63-30-10(4) and the statutory duty imposed
upon respondents to at least once a year visit and examine each
corporation in the state doing doing a banking business.

The

latter with its detailed duties specified in Section 7-1-8 is
more like an audit of books and records than an inspection of
property.
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POINT IV
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHIELD THE
RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO ENFOCE
THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER
The respondents claimed in the lower court that they
further had the discretionary decision of whether or not to
issue administrative orders.
such might be the case.

The appellants do not deny that

However, once the decision had been

made to issue a cease and desist order and such an order was
issued to Grove Finance Company, a duty arose at that time to
properly enforce such an order.

In Seymour National Bank v.

State, 384 N.E.2d 1177, 1185 (Ind. 1979), the Court held that a
public official had discretion in formulating policy.

Once the

policy was formulated, however, the same official acted in a
ministerial capacity in the implementation of the policy.

The

respondents in this case totally failed to enforce the cease
and desist order and substantial deposits were made in Grove
Finance after the order was issued.
property.
POINT V
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES
AND STATE OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONS
The limitation imposed upon any potential recovery of
the appellants due to the operation of the Governmental
Immunity Act is a denial of equal protection.
The Governmental Immunity Act violates equal
protection by classifying people in three different ways:
-25-

1*

It classifies victims of negligence by whether

they have been injured by a non-governmental tort-feasor or a
government tort-feasor.

It denies or places significant

limitations on recovery to the latter class.

(See Sections

63-30-10, 63-30-29, Utah Code Ann.)
2.

It classifies victims of government tort-geasors

by whether they have suffered personal injury or property
damage.

It differentiates between the groups by the amount of

recovery allowed.
3.

It classifies victims of government tort-feasors

negligence by the severity of the injury.

It may grant full

recovery to those victims who have not sustained significant
injury by allowing them to recover up to $100,000 in damages.
It discriminates against the severely injured victims by
denying any recovery for any injuries over $100,000.
The guarantees of equal protection under the
consideration requires all persons to be treated alike under
like circumstances.

See U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV,

Section 1, and Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24.

When

a fundamental right is affected, the State must show a
compelling state interest in order to justify the complained of
discrimination.

J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, ETC., 655, P.2d 1133

(Utah 1982); Utah Public Employees Ass'n. v. State, 610 P.2d
1272 (Utah 1980).
The right to bring a civil action for personal
injuries has been recognized as being a fundamental right.
White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983).
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CONCLUSION
The summary judgment rendered in favor of the
defendants-respondents in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County State of Utah, should be reversed.

The duties

of inspection of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions
imposed by Title 7 and Title 70B are in fact mandatory or
ministerial and the negligent failure of the State to perform
its duties cannot be waived.

Further, the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act as applied by the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County State of Utah in reaching its decision is
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clauses
found in the Fourteenth Admendment, Section 1 of the United
State Constitution and Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution.
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